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The first line of defense for workers laid off from their jobs has been Unemployment Insurance (UI). Each
state establishes a trust fund financed through premiums levied against employers. Unemployed workers
usually receive benefits for an average of 26 weeks, and only if their unemployment is of no fault of their own.
They must also show that they have been looking for reemployment. But herein lies the problem. The system,
as it was designed, assumes that layoffs will be temporary and that in most cases workers will be recalled to
their employers. Therefore, the system was designed to provide temporary assistance to tide workers over until
they would be recalled. It wasn't designed to assist them with transitions, from one type of labor to another. But
with deepening recessions over the years, downsizing, and more and more plant closures resulting in greater
permanent displacement, the UI system has increasingly found itself strained. For one thing, it isn't entirely
clear that the reserves exist to provide for all the unemployed. During times of recession, state trust funds
haven't always proved to be adequate, and states over the years have had to borrow funds from the U.S.
treasury.(1) Moreover, a system initially designed to ensure short-term income maintenance is ill-equipped to
meet the needs of a dislocated workforce which needs assistance in making transitions. As the UI system was
an outgrowth of the disruption caused by industrial production, it would seem that UI needs to be reformed so
that it can better meet the needs of an economy in transition -- from industrial to post-industrial or from
production to information. 
The changing nature of the global economy does raise the question as to whether an unemployment insurance
system can do more for displaced workers than simply providing them with income maintenance. Should the
system provide retraining? Could the money which is paid out as benefits be put to better use? But the fact that
the system may be inadequate for today's economic realities by no means obviates the need for income
maintenance by those who are displaced? The question is what more can the system do for them than simply
tiding them over until they find new jobs? Could it assist them in starting their own businesses by providing
their benefits in one lump sum? Or could the money be channeled towards training efforts? And yet, the
question of whether UI money could be better spent another way hinges on the assumption that unemployed
workers don't necessarily use the money properly. Or that they wouldn't need it if they would only make a
more concerted effort to find jobs, which they don't feel compelled to do because the system has afforded them
the luxury of leisure time over the imperative of job search. The system, then, immunizes workers against the
vagaries of the market place at a social cost. This notion is actually consistent with the literature on
unemployment insurance. But at the same time, it may well miss the point. As much as economic models can
explain individual behavior in terms of incentives and disincentives, it isn't entirely clear that these models
understand the true nature of unemployment. Unemployment isn't homogeneous.(2) Moreover, unemployment
does more than simply cause a disruption in people's income which can be partially compensated through UI
benefits. It causes disruption in the structure and fabric of their lives which cannot be compensated no matter
how generous the provision.(3) The purpose of this paper is to examine the current system of Unemployment
Insurance in the U.S. and explore alternatives to it. What I intend to argue is that although there isn't sufficient
evidence at this time to justify a complete overhaul of the system, there are nonetheless some adjustments
which could be made which would effectively reduce the number of layoffs.
The Current UI System
The Unemployment Insurance system has historically served two principal functions. It has offered laid-off
workers critical income protection during temporary spells of joblessness. And by helping to protect theincomes of jobless workers, it has thus sustained ordinary spending habits, which has served to give the
economy a needed boost during times of recession.(4) Hence the objectives of UI are alleviation of hardship,
prevention of unemployment, and the promotion of reemployment. The relief of financial hardship for
unemployed workers by partial replacement of wage loss is a central aim of the program. And one value of UI,
as opposed to simple public relief, is that it enables recipients to maintain their self-respect, as well as it
prevents them from sliding into destitution. Another preventive aim of UI is to help minimize the spread and
depth of recession through the maintenance of purchasing power. UI can also contribute to the reemployment
objective in two ways: 1) It minimizes the disincentive to work -- the preference for leisure -- by placing limits
on the weekly amount and the duration of benefits paid. And 2) it minimizes the disincentive to work through
job-search and availability-for-work requirements, as well as the way they are administered.(5) The duration of
benefits should strongly reflect two factors: 1) The prevailing social view about the responsibility for
unemployment and reemployment; and 2) The amount of time it takes an individual to acquire and apply
relevant labor market information and to find and accept an appropriate job offer. There are two broad
categories -- monetary and nonmonetary -- for determining whether or not an unemployed individual is eligible
for UI benefits. Monetary eligibility conditions are intended to ensure that those who receive UI had
substantial attachment to the labor force prior to their unemployment. Nonmonetary conditions are to ensure
that UI recipients are available for and actively seeking work, and also that they are unemployed involuntarily
or that they left their jobs for good reasons.(6)
Unemployment insurance in both the U.S. and Canada differ somewhat from that in Europe. The typical
system in the U.S. and Canada is that workers receive benefits if laid off, but nothing if hours are simply cut
back. The typical system in Europe, however, routinely pays short-term compensation (STC) to workers on
reduced hours. The discontinuous benefits schedule characterized by the American system would appear to
provide incentive for the use of layoffs rather than work sharing during an economic downturn. By contrast,
the idea behind STC is that instead of laying off its workforce, it could simply reduce the work week, for
example, from five days to four and have its employees draw partial benefits on the fifth day. It is thus believed
that STC encourages work sharing, as opposed to layoff.(7) And yet, despite similarities between the U.S. and
Canada, there are some differences as well. There is a gap between the U.S. and Canadian unemployment rates,
and these differences, it is believed, can be attributed primarily to the more liberal UI benefits in Canada.
During the 1970s, benefits to unemployed persons other than job losers were significantly liberalized under
Canada's Unemployment Insurance Act of 1971. The labor force participation of women also accelerated. In
the U.S. benefits are granted primarily to job losers -- workers on temporary and permanent layoff. And under
some limited circumstances, workers who quit for "just cause" can qualify. But in general, job leavers, new
entrants, and reentrants into the labor force cannot qualify for benefits. The mandate of Canada's law -- to
assist "all individuals experiencing temporary earnings interruptions" -- greatly enhanced the availability of UI
to unemployed persons other than job losers.(8)
This is only one of the limitations of the American UI system relative to others. In a recent study by the
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC), it was agreed that the goals established at the
inception of UI are as relevant today as they were in 1935. The program provides an initial line of economic
defense for those who become unemployed through no fault of their own, and it spares many of them the
indignation of public relief. It also accumulates reserves during periods of prosperity -- reserves which are
used during economic downturns to assist unemployed workers in meeting their necessary expenses. And it
also serves an important macroeconomic role of helping to stabilize the economy during recessions. But
increasingly, jobs are part-time, contingent, or temporary. Since its inception in 1935, the UI system has been
based on principles of federalism, with the majority of responsibility for financing and administration being at
the state level. The system is "experience rated," which means that employers who have been responsible for
imposing greater demands on the system pay higher taxes, and thus bear a greater share of the system's costs.
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by UI, with employers paying taxes accordingly. There are,
however, exceptions to this. The first exception is that non-profit employers don't pay taxes, despite the fact
that their employees are eligible. This exception actually generated an additional cost of $300 million in 1992.
And the second exception is that agricultural workers on small farms aren't covered by UI at all. At a minimum,
the ACUC recommends the reversal of these exemptions.(9)
Most UI programs provide eligible unemployed workers with a monetary payment to replace some percentageof their previous wages. Wage replacement is but one objective that is shared by all UI systems. UI programs
can also serve as a fiscal stimulus tool that helps stabilize the macroeconomy by injecting additional money
into the economy during periods of a downturn. But despite the primacy of wage replacement in the U.S.
system, most measures of this function suggest that it is less generous in this country than elsewhere. The
percentage of unemployed who receive UI in the U.S. is significantly lower than it is in other countries. The
economic stabilization capacity of the U.S. UI system is one of the most limited among nations with similar
economies for two principal reasons. 1) Because the wage replacement function is limited, the capacity of the
UI system to have a significant macroeconomic effect is also limited. And 2) the increasing reliance on a
pay-as-you-go funding structure in the U.S. has also limited its capacity to act as a significant economic
stabilizer. Moreover, it isn't clear whether the jobs being accepted by unemployed individuals are the most
appropriate jobs in which they take full advantage of an individual's skills, education and experience. One
justification for the payment of unemployment benefits is that they allow an individual to focus on searching
for a new job.(10) 
Labor Disincentive?
The UI literature generally supports the notion that UI may in fact create a labor disincentive. Economists have
typically viewed unemployment compensation as having a negative effect on the labor market. The argument
typically is that high benefits cause the unemployed to be less willing to accept job offers, and also induces
those in employment to quit to become unemployed. The rise in unemployment in Western Europe since the
1970s, and its persistence in a number of countries, is attributed in part to more generous levels of benefit
payments.(11) Feldstein, for instance, has argued that the current system of UI provides substantial incentive for
increased temporary layoff unemployment, and that of all unemployment spells, temporary layoffs account for
50%. UI essentially increases the duration of any given spell of unemployment, but it may also induce more
very short spells of unemployment. Employers are more willing to lay off workers when they are confident that
they will return when recalled. And employees are more willing to be laid off if they can be confident that they
will be recalled. The average UI benefit replacement ratio implied by current law can account for about half of
temporary layoff unemployment. An increase in the UI benefit replacement ratio from 0.4 to 0.6 raised the
temporary layoff unemployment rate by about 0.5 percentage points -- or 1/3 of the average temporary layoff
unemployment rate of 1.6% in March of 1971.(12) 
The literature could be said to consist of a single theme: where benefits are higher, so too are unemployment
rates. And where workers expect that there is a chance of being recalled to their former jobs, the likelihood of
searching for new employment is diminished. Katz and Meyer, for instance, found that employer recall policies
were primary determinants of durations of unemployment spells of individuals with non-negligible recall
prospects. Those who expect to be recalled spend less time searching for jobs and have a lower finding rate
than other UI recipients. Also the probability of leaving unemployment and finding new jobs increases greatly
around the time that UI benefits lapse.(13) Contrarily, it is suggested that the reduced availability of UI benefits
to job quitters might be expected to reduce the frequency of quitting because it increases the expected costs of
leaving employment. If the denial of benefits does in fact reduce quitting, it would only underscore the
voluntary aspect of quitters' unemployment and strengthen the argument that such unemployment shouldn't be
compensated.(14) But do the findings of Katz and Meyer really support the notion that UI creates labor
disincentives, or do they merely confirm the assumptions of a model predicated on industrial production? That
is, if workers believe that they are to be recalled as opposed to believing that they have been displaced, they are
going to behave differently. Displacement differs from temporary layoffs in that those jobs which have been
eliminated will never exist again.(15) Rather than implying that UI must be decreased -- as much of the
literature does -- UI must in fact consist of more than simply income maintenance.
The central premise underlying this literature appears to be that the utility maximizing individual wouldn't work
if s/he did not really have to. And to the extent that UI enables the utility maximizing individual not to work
because it immunizes him/her from risk, it only furthers that assumption. Workers, it is assumed, exhibit
utility-maximizing behavior -- they reveal it through their actions. Income, whether it is derived from labor,
transfer payments or other sources, is assumed to give utility. It is also assumed that nonmarket activity --
including leisure -- gives more utility per hour than does work. The income/leisure combination offered bymost UI programs might be preferred by some UI recipients to those offered by a return to comparable
employment. Consequently, some recipients may not be diligent in their search for work, or they may adopt
criteria for accepting employment which are unreasonably high from society's point of view. This might result
in a tendency to remain on the unemployment rolls for longer periods of time.(16) And as Meyer has further
found, higher UI benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving
unemployment. But the probability of leaving rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse.(17) On the
other hand, those who have been closed out of a job may be in a state of denial. During the early days of their
unemployment, they don't really believe that their jobs aren't going to come back, but it finally dawns on them
as time lapses. 
Still, the literature maintains that workers are at leisure to wait and see because UI offers them something to fall
back on. Feldstein and Poterba explain this in terms of workers' reservation wages -- the minimum wages that
they will be willing to accept. The principal imperfection in modern labor markets, as they see it, is the
downward rigidity of existing nominal wages. Consequently, the decline in marginal value of the product of an
employee's labor is likely to cause temporary or permanent layoff, as opposed to a downward wage adjustment.
Employees who lose jobs are likely to find that the wages at their next jobs are lower than the wages on the job
just lost. Through a comparison of reservation wages with wages of last jobs, Feldstein and Poterba attempt to
show the distortions caused by the UI system. The study rests on the assumption that the probability of
finding an acceptable job is likely to decline as the reservation wage exceeds the previous wage. The
individual's private reservation wage is then said to be at least equal to his/her previous wage. From their
sample of unemployed individuals, 24% indicated that they would accept a wage less than 90% of their last
wage. An additional 11% were willing to accept between 90-100% of their previous wage. A further 27%
indicated that they would accept any wage equal to or greater than the last wage, but nothing less. The
cumulative percentage of reservation wage rates was less than or equal to 62%. 38% of the unemployed in the
sample had a reservation wage greater than their previous earnings. About 1/4 of those who required a wage
increase said they would accept an increase of less than 10%. Fully 28% of unemployed persons said they
would only return to work if they received a wage which was 10% higher than their previous wage. The
important reason for the high reservation wage ratios and the high fraction of individuals requiring a wage
increase as a condition of reemployment is the system of UI benefits. The Department of Labor only classifies
one as unemployed if one is available for work and has made efforts to find a job within the past four weeks.
But no limit is placed on the individual's reservation wage in defining a willingness to work -- hence
unemployment status. Although UI reduces the cost of unemployment to the individual, it can raise the
unemployment rate in several quite different ways. For the individual who is unemployed and looking for a job,
the lower cost of unemployment implies a higher reservation wage, and hence a longer period of
unemployment. And among those who are employed, the low potential cost of unemployment induces
temporary layoff in response to reductions in product demand -- even in response to seasonal fluctuations in
employees' marginal revenue product.(18) 
But all this shows is the impact on their behavior. The implication would appear to be clear. Either eliminate UI
so that workers will be forced to lower their reservation wages equal to those jobs which are available or tax UI
benefits so that whatever incentive there is to remaining unemployed is reduced. Solon, for instance, found that
the introduction of taxes on UI benefits for higher-income claimants -- those in families earning more than
$20,000 -- did reduce the mean duration on UI from 10.8 weeks in 1978 to 8.4 weeks in 1979. The large
duration reduction among high-income claimants suggests the possibility that the introduction of benefit
taxation did indeed affect unemployment duration. And yet, he concedes that the work-incentive effect wouldn't
necessarily prove that benefit taxation is a good policy, as it would make UI less effective in its objective of
insuring job losers against income reductions.(19) But then, why assume that the duration rates were lower
because of benefit taxation as opposed to maybe more jobs commensurate with their skills level being available
in 1979 over 1978? Is there any real logic to the theory that UI has a negative impact on work incentive? Even
if we were to concede the truth of these findings, they do not in any way prove that jobs do exist. Moreover,
why would one want to be on UI at only a fraction of one's previous wages?
Burtless, for instance, is insistent that current knowledge of the impact of UI on labor supply is simply too
fragile. "Neither theory nor available empirical evidence permits us to predict unequivocally the net effect of
unemployment insurance on labor supply." By providing insurance to workers, UI offers something of valueto people who become employed, and it may thus increase the attractiveness of market work. And by
supplementing the incomes of workers who become unemployed, it can slow down the process of
reemployment. But without better empirical evidence than is currently available, it is impossible to predict
which of these two basic effects will predominate. UI may increase the amount of economically productive job
search. It might raise the average productivity of workers by improving the match between jobs and workers. In
situations where there are say two job vacancies and two unemployed workers, it can be economically
productive to subsidize the workers to sort themselves into the two jobs that their joint output and earnings are
maximized. This isn't to say that there aren't adverse consequences, rather there is insufficient evidence to make
any grand sweeping categorical conclusions.(20)
It is on this point that Feldstein and Poterba assume too much. It may be true that UI may increase the
reservation wages of those at the lower end of the income scale, but does it really have much of an impact for
those at the top? What benefit could there be for a high income individual to sit at leisure at a fraction of
previous pay over intensely searching for a replacement of previous wages? UI more closely approximates the
previous earnings of those at the lower end of the scale. But as each state imposes a maximum benefit, the
higher the previous income was, the less attractive UI becomes. Feldstein and Poterba simply fail to control for
demographics, or for that matter the type of employment.
Nevertheless, as Atkins and Micklewright argue, there has been a failure to distinguish several different labor
market states. Employment cannot be regarded as homogeneous. A temporary job in the black economy is not
the same as a career position with a large enterprise. Work cannot be treated as a homogeneous state either.
The unemployed person who returns to work may enter employment or self-employment, and it is the latter
which will have different implications, especially with regards to the future entitlement to unemployment
compensation. Employment may be full or part-time. There is a distinction to be made between "regular" and
"marginal" jobs. Regular jobs are full time and have the expectation of continued employment. They are
generally covered by statutory employment protection and are part of the legal economy. They may also offer
some prospect for promotion and may involve a substantial element of general or specific training. Marginal
jobs, on the other hand, may be temporary or casual; they may be dead-end jobs; they may be part of the black
economy; and/or they may be homeworkers. But as they maintain, the treatment of unemployment
compensation in the literature has been unsatisfactory for three reasons: 1) In focusing on benefit levels, it has
ignored other dimensions of unemployment compensation, whose effects may be more important; 2) It has
taken too simplistic a view of the way in which unemployment benefits work in the real world; and 3) The exit
from unemployment may have quite different consequences depending on the destination.(21) 
For the sake of argument, let's say it is true that unemployed workers are more likely to look for work as they
approach the point of benefit exhaustion. But is it necessarily true that they waited this long because they
desired leisure time? If work is the central activity around which people organize their lives, it stands to reason
that the absence of work will be a source of major disruption in their lives. Perhaps the shock of losing a job
will effectively immobilize them during the early weeks of unemployment. It may take 26 weeks for them to
realize that their layoffs aren't temporary, but permanent. To suggest, as these studies would seem to, that these
people would prefer not to work for a period is to ignore the great stigma that many with a continuous work
history feel when they are suddenly without work.(22) The real issue is the misdesign of the system given
current realities, rather than its distortive impact on the behavior of the unemployed. The question, then, is how
could it be better designed? The focus on reservation wages also diverts attention from the real issue of whether
there is a skills match between those who are laid off and those jobs which are available. To find the
appropriate match may take more time, and UI may offer some more breathing space. But this is not quite the
same as saying that jobs which exist do not match reservation wages, and therefore they go unfilled. Jobs
which do exist may simply not offer an appropriate skills match.
Demographics
To a large extent, the UI system rests on many of the same assumptions of the Schumpeterian model of
"creative destruction." According to this model, old and obsolete products and production processes and
technologies are continuously destroyed and replaced by the new and technologically advanced. A vibrant
capitalist economy, in other words, operates through life cycles, and as products and processes reach the end oftheir life cycles, they will be replaced by new ones.(23) As far as those workers who are displaced from old
industries are concerned, they will eventually be absorbed by the newer ones that come in to take their place.
The problem is that there is a lag time. UI, in its current form, did represent a labor adjustment policy for a
system in which the new which replaced the old would in essence require the same skills levels among
employees. New industries utilizing similar production processes and technologies could rely on the same
labor pools. There was, in short, no expectations that workers would shift occupations or that they would need
to retrain. But over the years technologies have changed and the result has been an apparent skills mismatch.
There is no question that the Schumpeterian model leads to a vibrant capitalism, but at the same time a more
effective labor adjustment program may be necessary to bridge the apparent gap. The first question, however, is
just who are the unemployed? The second question is just what are the expected trends, i.e the employment
outlook for the future? 
According to figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the overall unemployment rates ranged from 5.5% in
1990 to 6.8% in 1993, with a peak of 7.4% in 1992. But when the figures are broken down according to
occupation and industry, some interesting results emerge. 
Table I Unemployment rates according to occupation and industry
Occupation
    Managerial and professional specialty 2.6
    Technical, sales, and administrative support 5.0
    Precision production, craft and repair 6.2
    Operators, fabricators, and laborers 8.9
    Farming, forestry, and fishing 8.3
Industry
    Nonagricultural private wage and salary workers 6.3
        Goods-producing industries 6.9
        Mining 5.3
        Construction 11.7
        Manufacturing 5.5
            Durable goods 5.1
            Nondurable goods 5.6
    Service-producing industries 6.0
Transportation and public utilities 4.8
        Wholesale and retail trade 7.3
        Finance, insurance, and real estate 3.5
        Services 5.8
    Government workers 3.4
    Agricultural wage and salary workers 11.1
* these are averages for the thirteen month period from the
beginning of January 1994 until the end of January 1995
What stands out among the occupations is that those in production and other types of factory work have higher
unemployment rates, and these are precisely the types of people likely to be displaced in today's economy as a
function of a permanent plant closure, as opposed to a temporary layoff which would have been characteristicof yesterday's economy. Or stated differently, those industries requiring lower skills levels from their workers
are bound to have higher unemployment rates. What this suggests in terms of developing alternatives to the
current UI system is that policies need to be tailored to those workers who are displaced disproportionately
from the industrial manufacturing based economy for whom UI was initially designed, as opposed to those
displaced from the post-industrial economy. When looking at the distribution of unemployment according to
reason over the same time period, we find the following:
Table II Percent Distribution of unemployed according to reason
    Total unemployed 100.0
Job losers and persons who completed temporary
jobs 47.7
    On temporary layoff 12.2




A characteristic which appears to stand out in today's post-industrial economy is that among the job losers,
those who are permanently laid off are at least three times those who are only temporarily laid off. This would
again suggest that more is needed than simply income maintenance. Rather what is needed is a policy which
will facilitate labor market adjustments, as layoffs are more permanent, and so too are job changes. When
looking at the distribution of unemployed according to their duration over the same period, we find the
following:
Table III Percent Distribution of unemployed according to duration  
Total unemployed 100.0
    Less than 5 weeks 34.6
    5 to 14 weeks 30.0
    15 weeks and over 35.4
    15 to 26 weeks 15.3
There appears to be something magical about the 15th week of unemployment, whereby a higher percentage of
unemployed are unemployed during the first fourteen weeks. But after 15 weeks, the percentage of
unemployed drops. The question, then, is what is significant about the fifteenth week? And yet, the issue of
unemployment spell is quite important given that the mainstream literature holds that the percentages of
unemployed workers will diminish as it approaches the point where UI benefits would be terminated. Table III
might appear to confirm those findings that suggest that workers may not begin to intensively look for work
until they reach the point of benefit exhaustion. As much as 64% of those who are unemployed may be
unemployed for up to fifteen weeks. But the number drops to 35.4% after fifteen weeks. Even then we find that
close to 80% of those who were unemployed did appear to return to work within 27 weeks. But what we do not
know from these figures is of the 80% who are unemployed during the 27 week period, how many are working
full time and at equivalent wage rates.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' survey of worker displacement during the early 1990s, about half
of those who lost their full time jobs during the period of 1991-93 were reemployed in such jobs by February
1994 and had earnings equal to or greater than those on their lost job. But many others were either employed
part-time, unemployed, or simply out of the labor force altogether. Those with the highest rates of displacement
were those without substantial experience with their employers. And persons with less than three years oftenure (the official definition of displacement) made up half of the total 9 million displaced workers, whereas
they comprised only about one-third of all workers. The greatest number of displacements occurred in the
manufacturing industry, with 1.5 million factory workers being displaced between 1991 and 1993. Although
53% of those reemployed full time reported earning the same or more than their jobs which were lost, those in
transportation, public utilities, construction and manufacturing were more likely to find new jobs at
substantially lower wage rates. Their new compensation was likely to be 80% or less than their lost jobs. These
findings would certainly suggest the need to have some type of retraining program which will work to ensure
that replacement wages will be similar. Also according to this survey, 61% of the displaced workers received
UI, and of those who received UI, slightly more than 40% exhausted them. On the other hand, the proportion
of displaced workers who exhausted their benefits was lower in the early 1990s than it was during the 1980s
when the U.S. economy was feeling the effects of back-to-back recessions.(24) On the one hand, we may not
have a problem in that most people who are laid off find reemployment within twenty seven weeks. But on the
other hand, if a considerable proportion of those who do find reemployment are either in different occupations,
working at reduced wages or simply as contingent workers, there is a problem in that the system isn't helping
them develop marketable skills. The system is merely equipped to provide temporary relief and move people
off the UI rolls as quickly as possible. And this simply obscures the real issues.
And what about the 20.1% that are unemployed for more than 27 weeks? Most states only provide UI up to 26
weeks. If it is the case that this cohort has passed the point of benefit exhaustion, what happens to the thesis
that UI encourages leisure? The large percentage of this cohort may actually underscore the notion that there is
a skills mismatch in the replacement of jobs. This point is only underscored more by the findings in Table IV 
Table IV Percent of unemployed persons according to reason and duration
Reason,
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jobs 41.7 31.4 26.9 15.2 11.7Job leavers 40.3 29.0 30.7 14.7 16.0
Reentrants 38.7 25.6 35.7 15.2 20.5
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jobs 37.7 33.9 28.4 14.1 14.3
Job leavers 36.8 30.3 32.9 13.8 19.1
Reentrants 34.8 22.0 43.3 16.1 27.1
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jobs 45.9 24.7 29.5 19.4 10.1
Job leavers 40.2 30.5 29.4 14.8 14.5
Reentrants 37.9 26.5 35.6 13.8 21.8
New entrants 33.8 23.9 42.3 10.9 31.4Both sexes,
16 to 19
years














47.4 40.9 11.7 9.5 2.2
Permanent




jobs (') (') (') (') (')
Job leavers (') (') (') (') (')
Reentrants 46.1 29.5 24.4 16.5 7.9
New entrants 34.9 29.0 36.1 16.2 19.9
* these figures are only for the month of
January 1995 
What is consistent throughout is that most of those on temporary layoff are only unemployed for less that five
weeks, whereas those on permanent layoff -- those who may be displaced -- are more likely to be unemployed
for fifteen weeks or more. When looking at unemployment according to mean duration of unemployment
during the month of January 1995, we find the following:







Total, 16 years and over 16.5 7.7
16 to 19 years 11.5 5.3
20 to 24 years 11.9 4.8
25 to 34 years 16.0 7.8
35 to 44 years 18.9 9.0
45 to 54 years 22.0 10.4
55 to 64 years 22.3 9.4
65 years and over 20.8 7.8
Men, 16 years and over 16.9 7.9
16 to 19 years 11.4 6.2
20 to 24 years 11.9 4.925 to 34 years 16.9 8.1
35 to 44 years 18.5 8.4
45 to 54 years 23.1 10.5
55 to 64 years 25.0 12.1
65 years and over 25.0 9.5
Women, 16 years and over 15.9 7.5
16 to 19 years 11.8 4.2
20 to 24 years 11.8 4.5
25 to 34 years 14.9 7.4
35 to 44 years 19.6 9.9
45 to 54 years 20.8 10.2
55 to 64 years 19.0 7.9
65 years and over (') (')
Race
White, 16 years and over 15.4 7.2
Men 16.2 7.5
Women 14.2 6.7




Men, 16 years and over:
Married, spouse present 17.2 8.3
Widowed, divorced or separated 18.5 8.3
Single (never married) 16.2 7.2
Women, 16 years and over:
Married, spouse present 15.1 7.5
Widowed, divorced, or separated 19.1 9.2
Single (never married) 14.7 6.2
This merely shows that the mean duration increases along with age. And yet, the variation really isn't that great.
Nevertheless, there may be two ways to look at this: Either there is no problem because the duration on
unemployment isn't too long, or because those between the ages of 35-64 will have longer periods of duration
we need to raise questions as to where efforts to offer retraining or some other alteration of the system should
be targeted. Older workers are more likely to have been with their employers for longer periods of time, and
therefore to be more in need of skills upgrading. But when we look at the duration of unemployment according
to occupation and industry, we find a little more variation:









Technical, sales, and administrative
support 15.9 6.9
Service occupations 16.5 7.8
Precision production, craft and repair 15.3 7.8
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 15.3 6.9





Durable goods 18.2 8.5
Nondurable goods 17.5 8.8
Transportation 17.8 8.5
Wholesale and retail trade 15.5 6.9
Finance, insurance, and real estate 15.7 8.9
Services 16.2 7.6
Public administration 25.5 10.4
No previous work experience  19.5 10.1
The next question, of course, is just what the employment trends for the future are. According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the U.S. labor force is expected to increase over the 1992-2005 period by 24 million, from
127 million to 151 million. 51.2 million are expected to enter the labor force, with 27.7 million representing the
replacement for those workers who leave due to death, retirement and other reasons. Virtually all job growth is
expected to be in the service-producing industries. Approximately one third of all jobs created are expected to
be in health, business and social services. The fastest growing jobs will be in professional specialties,
managerial and technical occupations -- those that would require the most education. And yet, the fastest
growing major occupational group requiring little education will be the service worker. The seven fastest
growing occupations are health and computer related -- positions requiring higher skills levels.(25) These
projections would only tend to reinforce the current trends in what has come to be known as the two tiered
economy. Those working in low skills service occupations will find themselves in the low wage labor market,
while those working in high skills occupations will find themselves in the high-wage labor market. The
implications would appear to be rather clear: If what has traditionally been regarded as the middle class is to be
maintained, there will need to be an array of training programs in place which can facilitate the labor market
adjustment from the industrial sector based economy to the post-industrial sector based one. The question
remaining is whether the UI system should be the focus of such efforts.
Alternatives?Under federal law, UI claimants may participate in state-approved training without a loss of benefits. But
current law does not allow for the use of state unemployment funds for anything other than payment of
benefits, certain refunds, and payment of medical insurance premiums in a state-approved plan at claimant's
option. A state may not withdraw money from its unemployment trust fund to pay the costs of job search,
training, or starting a new business. And yet, once benefits have been paid, there are no restrictions on how a
claimant chooses to spend it, which could then include job search, training, and relocation. Current law, in short,
doesn't offer much room for other alternatives to the traditional UI system. But there are a number of
alternatives which should be considered before looking at the issue of training. These alternatives include:
self-employment, individual development accounts, employment bonuses, more perfect experience rating, and
work sharing.
Self-Employment . One option would be to allow for UI recipients to either collect their UI in one lump sum
which could be applied towards the start of a business, or to allow them to draw regular UI benefits while they
are trying to start one. Some European countries already have this option; the U.S. does not. Canada has
actually experimented with self-employment programs as an alternative to re-employment options. The first
experiment was the Self-Employment Initiative (SEI) which was introduced in 1987 as part of the Community
Future program under the Canadian Job Strategy. SEI was later replaced by the Canadian Self-Employment
Assistance (SEA) program in 1992. This move had the effect of creating a self-employment program within the
mandate of UI Developmental Use. A study by the Canadian government's Insurance Programs Directorate
found that SEI participants were on average successful in reducing their reliance on UI. On average, 1988-89
cohorts of SEI clients had 1.2 fewer claims after SEI compared to the average of the three years before SEI
participation. The SEI program overall also had a positive impact on total earnings of the participants. The total
annual earnings of each participant increased, on average, by $3,911 relative to the comparable group of
non-participants. Increases did vary regionally, with the highest gains being found in Newfoundland with an
average of $9,853 per participant, and the lowest being found in Quebec with $5,521 per participant.
The initial SEI program made income support available at a flat rate to eligible candidates for a maximum of 52
weeks while they established a business. The SEA option, in addition to income support, incorporated training
as a central part of client support. The principal differences between the SEI and SEA were: 1) Geographical
restrictions were relaxed under the SEA. Eligibility can now be established by UI clients living in selective
labor market areas that aren't Community Futures  programs; 2) Training is made available to SEA participants
in order to increase their chances of success in self-employment, whereas it had been left to participants under
SEI to find it on their own; 3) Designated groups are treated as priority clients with respect to acceptance into
the SEA program; with SEI they weren't; 4) Prior to being accepted into the SEI program each applicant was
required to submit a business plan. Under SEA, the requirement was dropped in favor of an orientation session
-- to determine the suitability of each applicant for self-employment; and 5) A flat rate of $230 was paid to SEI
participants. Under SEA, the average weekly UI benefit rate in 1992-93 was $327 including $8 for a
supplementary allowance.
An analysis of the SEI program demonstrates that SEI participants were successful in reducing their reliance
on UI. SEI clients, on average, had 1.2 fewer claims. They received 35.6 fewer paid weeks of UI benefits, and
$6,430 less in UI benefits in the three years following SEI than in an equivalent period prior to SEI
participation. Job tenure for participants immediately prior to SEI enrolment was brief. Approximately 71.7%
of UI participants worked one year or less in their jobs immediately prior to SEI enrolment. Moreover, the two
year overall survival rate was 88.7% and 83.6% between 1988-89 and 1989-90 respectively. The three year
overall survival rate was 76.2% between 1988-90.(26) The U.S. Labor department did conduct a review of the
unemployment insurance system and its alternatives and concluded that the available evidence on the
effectiveness of alternative uses of UI funds was not an adequate basis for major changes in a program which
has been successful in meeting its objectives since the 1930s.(27) And yet the prospect of starting a business
ought to offer any number of workers a tantalizing possibility. But then, this would assume that UI benefits
alone could be the source of sufficient start-up capital.
Individual Development Accounts?  Michael Sherraden has suggested that the American welfare state could be
reformed if the poor could be offered the opportunity to accumulate assets, which they would then be able to
draw upon in the future as the need might arise. The core of this strategy would be the Individual DevelopmentAccount (IDA).(28) As a variation on this, we might consider depositing UI benefits into such IDAs which
could then be used for the purpose of retraining. In this vein, the UI system could be made to do more than
simply offer income maintenance. It could assist in the transition. Still, this doesn't address the need that many
will still have for income maintenance during the period that they seek retraining or they are attempting to start
their own businesses.
Perhaps the system could be completely overhauled and we adopt Sherraden's solution to the challenge raised
by the current economic realities for the existing UI system. What if instead of offering UI when people are
laid off, we offered them credits to be deposited during the course of their working lives? Now somebody who
is suddenly displaced after twenty years of factory work for instance would have enough assets to live off of as
well as retrain. And for the one who isn't laid off, that account could further be drawn upon for the purposes of
changing careers or financing the education of one's children. Such a plan would encourage savings and
perhaps lead to greater independence.(29) Similarly, Robert Haveman has suggested that in lines with
overhauling the entire tax and transfer/redistribution system, we think of creating a Universal Personal Capital
Account for youths, whereby each youth upon reaching the age of 18, would receive a personal capital account
of say $20,000 from the government. The account would be interest earning and could be drawn upon for
approved purchases of education and training, as well as health care services. The idea here is to empower
individuals to make choices -- to generate more equal opportunities -- but at the same time maintain the concept
of personal responsibility. Individuals would be responsible for the choices they made, but they would also
have the incentives they need to train and/or retrain as necessary.(30) Although Haveman isn't necessarily
proposing this as a replacement for UI, a variation on this idea might certainly be worth looking at. Certainly it
would make for a more versatile welfare state.
Another version of this would be to impose an experience-rating tax on workers. Workers would have
individualized accounts similar to the individualized UI accounts employers currently have. Workers would
pay into their accounts while employed, and draw from it when unemployed. Those with low account balances
upon returning to work would be required to pay a higher tax rate on earnings. But it would also be possible to
provide a "cash-in" option, whereby the account balance could be turned over to workers on retirement. If such
a system were to be "perfectly" experience rated, it would impose extremely high tax rates on those individuals
who experience the most unemployment.(31)
Employment Bonuses?  Another option to consider along the lines of building greater incentives into the
system would be to offer employment bonuses. This would consist of a payment which would be made to an
unemployed individual when s/he accepted a job offer and met other qualifying conditions. The purpose is to
encourage more rapid reemployment, thereby lowering the overall unemployment rate. It has been suggested
that a reemployment bonus program could reduce the duration of insured unemployment without the adverse
consequences for workers who are offered a bonus. The Illinois Department of Employment Security
conducted two controlled experiments between mid-1984-1985 designed to test the effectiveness of cash
bonuses in reducing the duration of insured unemployment. In one experiment, known as the Claimant
Experiment , a random sample of new claimants for UI were instructed that they would qualify for cash
bonuses of $500 if they found a job of thirty hours or more per week within 11 weeks of filing UI claims and
if they held their jobs for more than four months. The intent was to create an incentive for claimants to search
more intensely for work. In the other experiment, known as the Employer Experiment , a second random
sample of new UI claimants were told that their next employer would qualify for cash bonuses of $500 if they
-- the claimants -- found a job within eleven weeks of filing UI claims and if they retained their jobs for four
months. Here the intent was to provide a marginal wage-bill subsidy -- a training subsidy -- that might reduce
the duration of insured unemployment. The four month employment requirement was intended to avoid the
possibility of fraudulent hire -- solely for the purpose of obtaining the bonus. Each claimant was assigned to
one of three groups: 1) control group; 2) claimant experiment treatment group; or 3) employer experiment
treatment group. The incentives facing the UI claimants assigned to the claimant experiment may be viewed
within the context of either a job search model or an income-leisure model of labor supply. Within the search
context, a $500 bonus creates incentive for unemployed workers to either lower their reservation wage or
search more intensely. Within the labor supply context, a $500 bonus raises the opportunity cost of leisure
consumed during the period of time immediately following the initial claim. It creates an incentive to substitute
income for leisure. The results strongly suggest that the claimant Experiment reduced the duration of jobsearch for those who participated in it. Also, the relatively rapid reemployment of Claimant Experiment
participants did not come at the expense of lower earnings. The data is thus consistent with the idea that faster
reemployment resulted from more intense job search efforts, and not from a rapid acceptance of job offers. 
According to Woodbury and Spiegelman, the results of the Claimant Experiment are unequivocal and strong.
The incentives created by the bonus -- paid out to 4,186 UI claimants -- reduced the state's regular benefits paid
to the randomly selected treatment group by an average of $158. And it reduced the average number of weeks
of insured unemployment by more than one week -- over the full benefit year -- compared with the randomly
selected control group. Also some results of the Employer Experiment were also unequivocal and strong.
White women who were randomly assigned to the Employer Experiment received $164 less in UI and
experienced one week less of insured unemployment than did white women assigned to the control group.(32)
Nevertheless, there was the question regarding the displacement effect, if any. Because the bonus program
makes it easier to fill vacancies, it might affect the job separation rate. The bonus program could make firms
more prone to terminate workers for cause and less prone to create conditions that would lower the probability
of voluntary quitting. Termination and voluntary quits create vacancies that are costly to fill, and because the
bonuses reduce these costs, they should rise as a result. Davidson and Woodbury estimated that the bonus
program wouldn't have a displacement effect on UI-eligible nonoffered workers, although in all cases there is
some displacement of UI-ineligible. Still, the Illinois bonus program had virtually no effect on the earnings of
those workers who were offered a bonus after reemployment.(33) Although the ACUC notes this as a possible
approach to modifying the UI system, it does caution that the effects are marginal at best. Paying recipients to
find jobs more quickly will have little effect if there are no jobs to be found.(34) 
At the same time, however, the data on these experiments, as is the case with other UI reforms, in inconclusive.
In a more comprehensive review of these experiments, Meyer has suggested that cost-benefit analyses indicate
that bonus experiments usually lead to small net losses for the UI program, and are about break-even for
society as a whole. If, for instance, claimants are induced to find a job more quickly, the job they find may be
less desirable. Experiments, however, show that there are no statistically significant declines in earnings. Many
of the bonuses offered to workers actually indicate no change in earnings, or a small increase. Still, it is unclear
as to whether experimental results can be directly applied to a permanent program. And there are three sources
to this uncertainty. The first is that if one group of individuals is encouraged to go back to work early, they
may gain employment at the expense of others who are unable to get jobs. Secondly, with a permanent
program, a different fraction of eligible claimants might apply for bonuses, thereby causing a change in the
costs of the bonus offer. And thirdly, by increasing the financial reward for short UI spells, a permanent bonus
would probably increase the number of people unemployed between job changes and increase the number of
UI filers. Although bonuses experiments do show that economic incentives do affect the speed with which
people leave the UI rolls, they do not necessarily demonstrate the desirability of a permanent reemployment
bonus program. On the contrary, simple cost/benefit analyses suggest that societal net benefits may be positive
about one half of the time, but they are negative in other cases. And they actually generate small losses for the
system. Rather, reemployment bonuses make filing for UI much more valuable, as claimants become more
eligible for a large payment if they file and then find a job soon. The permanent adoption of a reemployment
bonus could actually have important unintended negative effects, for the key drawback of the experiments is
that they cannot account for the effect of a reemployment bonus on the size of the claimant population.(35)
More Perfect Experience Rating . Another way to approach the issue of reform is ask how employer layoffs
might be reduced, as opposed to how workers might be better motivated to look for new jobs once they are laid
off. Such an approach might involve alterations in the UI financing system which would make it more costly
for employers to lay their workers off. In all other countries, UI benefits are financed by flat-rate payroll taxes,
or out of general tax revenues. There is no connection between an individual firm's behavior and its tax liability.
In the U.S. UI is financed through an experience rated payroll tax. Firms more likely to lay off their workers
are bound to pay higher taxes. And yet, as Robert Topel points out, the concept of experience rating of UI
taxes has very little relation to the idea of experience-rated premiums in the insurance literature. Rather an
imperfect experience rating of UI taxes is likely to encourage unemployment. Layoffs generate income for a
firm's workers that has no corresponding cost for employers, thereby creating an incentive to compensate
workers with UI rather than earnings. Unemployment thus becomes relatively more attractive. It implies that
both the incidence and duration of temporary layoff spells is increased.The easiest type of reform might simply be to have a more perfect experience rating by extending the range of
tax rates. According to Topel, a reduction in the minimum tax rate to zero and a dramatic increase in the
maximum rates would have two effects: 1) Unemployment subsidies would be sharply reduced. This might
result in the industrial mix of employment and production not being so severely distorted. And 2) the primary
source of wedge in layoff and rehire decisions would also be eliminated. This might have a strong impact on
unemployment in general, especially temporary layoffs.(36) 
Work Sharing . Work sharing involves the payment of UI benefits to employees as partial compensation for
the loss of hours worked. So instead of laying workers off, firms simply reduce their hours. This is the idea of
Short-term Compensation (STC). The Canadian government, for instance, has also been experimenting with
work sharing under its Skilled Investment Program of Canadian Jobs Strategy. Work sharing is considered
"counter-cyclical," as program use intensifies during periods of economic decline and subsides when the
economy improves. The principal objective of the program is to maintain employment levels during periods of
economic decline. Work sharing essentially seeks to avert layoffs by redistributing unemployment within a
firm rather than laying off workers. Work sharing consists of both primary and secondary objectives. The
primary objectives are to maintain local, regional and industrial employment levels during periods of short-term
adverse economic conditions, and to cushion the effects of permanent labor force reductions. The secondary
objectives are divided into two categories: firm and employee. For the firm they are to assist firms to maintain
their skill labor forces intact, and to avoid the costs to employees and the economy associated with temporary
layoff -- particularly the costs of recruiting and training new employees to replace those who wouldn't return
after the layoff period. And for the employee, the objectives are to assist them in maintaining their skill levels
and work motivation, and to reduce the dislocation and uncertainty as a result of the layoff. Another objective is
to permit a broader sharing of the burden of reduced employment activity and better income maintenance for
those who would otherwise be laid off. 
The basic concept underlying Work Sharing is to spread an overall reduction in working hours across all
workers in a designated unit instead of a more traditional alternative of temporarily laying off a smaller number
of workers. The lost wages are partially compensated by UI benefits -- approximately 60% of lost wages are
covered by UI benefits. On the other hand, one of the more theoretical disadvantages is that of inappropriate
adjustments. That is, some workers and firms may avoid more appropriate adjustment strategies because Work
Sharing encourages them to avoid these more drastic, but perhaps arguably more appropriate strategies. Still,
beginning with UI costs, Work Sharing is more expensive than the layoff alternative. The Insurance Programs
Directorate of Canada figured that there was a 33% cost disadvantage vis a vis layoffs using administrative data
on all Work sharing UI payments. Approximately $208 of UI payments were received by participants during
and after the program. Overall, those individuals who were most likely to have experienced layoff within a
Work Sharing unit did much better than their counterparts in the layoff comparison groups. But it was also
clear that Work Sharers who weren't going to be laid off did somewhat worse under the Work Sharing
program since they would have no reductions in earnings. In terms of skills retention, Work Sharing
participants are probably more likely to retain their original skills than the layoff group. The overall conclusion
of the study, then, is that there is an advantage after the agreement in terms of a quicker return to production for
participating Work Sharing firms. Work Sharing firms were found to be less likely to have experienced layoff
in their past employment history than employees in comparison groups. Although it is a good program, it has
nonetheless failed to respond to some of the key changes in its operational environment.(37) 
Nevertheless, there are those who believe that the addition of Work Sharing or STC is the key to strengthening
and sustaining the UI system during the next half century. Morand, while he acknowledges the studies
indicating that it can be more costly than traditional UI, argues that STC can be cheaper to administer for
workers, employers, and the system. It requires no job search to be policed or subverted. It keeps people out of
Employment Services' hair. It doesn't lead to denials and appeals. And it is the only labor market legislation
which enjoys support from corporations and unions, as well as conservatives and liberals. Because UI is
publicly perceived as legislation for losers, it may contribute to a more positive image, as well as enlarge the
constituency of supporters to the extent that it encourages and subsidizes job preservation. Most workers aren't
fired, but laid off. STC thus encourages a rightful expectation that everyone willing to work will continue to do
so.(38) Other alternatives might include reforming UI so that it is better integrated with training programs. The
government of Canada, for instance, has issued a report exploring some alternatives to the current system of
temporary subsistence payments. One approach is to design a new Employment Insurance Program, which
would more closely integrate UI with other employment development services. This approach essentially
recognizes that for some employment problems are deep-seated, and that income support isn't enough to help
them get back to work. Therefore, a distinction would be made between frequent claimants and occasional
claimants. Occasional claimants would receive Basic Insurance which would be no different from the current
system. Frequent claimants, however, would receive Adjustment Insurance which could be paid at a lower rate
than Basic Insurance. The remainder of their benefits would be in the form of in-kind retraining and or
counseling services. Depending on their labor market needs and the resources available, both frequent and
occasional claimants could have access to individualized packages of employment development services
designed to enhance their prospects for employment. At the same time, the report makes it clear that a new
Employment Insurance program would also need to take account of regional differences in the Canadian
workforce. The report also suggests that as a means of targeting resources where need is the greatest,
adjustment insurance benefits could also be income-tested, based on an assessment of claimants' individual or
family income.
The second approach would merely involve adjusting the existing UI program. It would retain the shape of the
current program and involve either increasing the number of weeks of work required to qualify for UI, or
reducing the amount of benefits available by shortening the duration and/or lowering the level of benefits. This
would supposedly free money up from the UI program which could then be channeled into other labor market
adjustment activities.(39) The problem with either of these approaches is that the need to create a system which
will better work to insure employment by no means obviates the need of those who are laid off or displaced for
income maintenance during the period in which they are engaged in retraining. At some basic level, an income
maintenance program is still necessary. The question which needs to be addressed is why an overhaul of the
current system, as opposed to simply offering retraining on top of UI. In other words, would it be possible to
better integrate current programs with the UI system?
What are the Current Programs?
If there is a need for an overhaul of the system, it is because of the problem of displaced workers. And indeed,
the response of the U.S. federal government has been modest. It has essentially relied on the current UI system
in conjunction with amendments to Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). JTPA was passed in
1982 to replace the discredited Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), as well as reorganize
the nation's remedial employment and training programs for the economically disadvantaged. The range of
services provided by CETA had included classroom training, on-the-job training in the private sector, public
service employment (PSE), and work experience. A small number also received job placement services. As
unemployment rose during the 1970s, CETA expenditures shifted away from training programs towards the
provision of PSE job slots. But the successor programs of JTPA and the Economic Dislocation and Worker
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) have moved away from PSE towards job search assistance services
(JSA).(40) But CETA was discontinued on the grounds that in addition to fraud and corruption, it hindered
movement into the private labor force by shielding workers from the market. And in fact, the modest size
reflected deep skepticism about the efficacy of government action.(41) The JTPA did provide job training and
job search services for both disadvantaged and dislocated workers, but it eliminated public service employment
and cash stipends for workers receiving training. It also attempted to obtain greater private employer
involvement through the creation of employer dominated Private Industry Councils. As of 1988, JTPA was
providing about $200 million annually at the state and local levels for the retraining of workers permanently
displaced from their jobs. In program year 1993, there were 226,000 total EDWAA participants at a cost of
$352 million. The Funds are generally used to provide classroom training, on-the-job training, and job search
assistance to program participants.(42) The UI system, to which this program was merely appended, was
initially designed to prevent workers from seeking career changes or upgrading their skills. But JTPA wasn't
enough.The first problem was that it lacked comprehensiveness. One effectively could not engage in retraining if the
result was to be the loss of needed UI benefits. The other problem was that workers and communities simply
lacked sufficient time to prepare and plan programs for the displaced because firms closing their doors weren't
providing adequate notice. This problem was in part rectified with the passage of the Worker Adjustment
Retraining Notification Act (WARN) in 1988. WARN mandated sixty days advance notice of plant closure to
those working in firms with more than 100 workers. But WARN lacks any real teeth. It has never been
assigned to an agency for enforcement. Rather, enforcement is through the courts. Nevertheless, an argument
for WARN is that one of the most important benefits of advance notice is that it gives companies, workers and
their unions, and government agencies time to plan and develop adjustment assistance.(43) 
WARN, to a large extent, was meant to be a complement to EDWAA, also passed in 1988. EDWAA
established a dislocated worker unit in each state which would be responsible for providing job counseling and
other services to the displaced. EDWAA provided authorized funding of $980 million during the fiscal year
beginning July 1989. The idea was to compensate for the deficiencies of JTPA and to in effect supplement the
existing UI program. And as Gary Hansen argues, by creating a national dislocated worker adjustment
program, the U.S. is one step closer to having a comprehensive and coherent national employment and training
policy.(44) But at the same time, the programs are disjointed. The Labor Department has also noted that for a
substantial proportion of workers displaced by plant closure or large-scale layoffs, basic readjustment services
are not sufficient to enable individuals to locate stable reemployment. Many dislocated workers need basic
educational skills and literacy training in addition to occupational training. What EDWAA does is emphasize
the importance of offering retraining when needed to prepare dislocated workers for jobs with long-term
potential.(45) The question in need of addressing is whether a comprehensive employment and training
program can be arrived at simply by tinkering at the margins with the existing programs, or whether it would be
better to have one single program. And if we opt for a single program, should it be separate from or part of the
existing UI program. And yet, it isn't at all clear that a discussion of overhauling the current UI program so that
it would effectively become what the Canadian government refers to as an employment insurance program can
really be divorced from more general discussions of overhauling the American welfare state in its entirety. 
A principal question, of course, is whether government training programs are really effective. Leigh has found
that based on demonstration projects in four states, JSA services have an intended effect on a variety of labor
market outcomes which include earnings, placement and employment rates, and the amount of the UI benefits.
The evidence gathered for all four demonstrations indicates that classroom training fails to have a sizeable
incremental effect on earnings, employment, and UI benefits above that of JSA only. It doesn't appear to be the
case that the additional effect of classroom training is large enough to compensate for the higher costs of those
services. Moreover, given that the objective of the Demonstrations was to encourage rapid reemployment
through the UI system, it isn't surprising that program services primarily assisted those workers with
marketable skills.(46) 
But we may also draw a lesson from the Canadian experience. As part of its UI Developmental Uses program,
Canada experimented with training programs, and found that they did have some beneficial results. To study
the effects of training, the Insurance Program Directorate looked at six categories of workers: Feepayers, Job
Development, Job Entry, Skill Shortages, DIR, and non-trainees. Feepayers were comprised of individuals who
were paying for training on their own in approved courses restricted to designated skills shortages and
language training. To qualify, recipients had to have been out of school for more than two years and their
courses had to meet at least 25 weeks, but they couldn't exceed 52 weeks. Though they were to pay for the
courses themselves, they would be able to draw UI while enrolled. In the Job Development program, clients
must have suffered long-term unemployment which was defined as being unemployed for at least 24 weeks
during the previous 30. The Job Entry program was for either women reentering the workforce after an
absence of at least three years (job re-entry) or youth who were no longer required to attend school and who
had little labor market experience. Such youth were defined as those who had been out of school for a
minimum of three years and who had been unemployed for at least 26 out of 52 weeks (job entry). Priority,
however, was to be given to high school drop-outs. Full-time courses couldn't last longer than 52 weeks, and
part-time courses couldn't last longer than 1,820 hours. The Skills Shortages program applied to those who
were "not job ready" and who didn't meet the criteria for other programs could be eligible if counselors felt thatthey could benefit from training. Training could last up to three years, but only those clients with a minimum of
five years in the labor force could train for longer than a year. In the DIR program, clients either took training
-- often in the evening -- which didn't interfere with their job search, or didn't inform authorities that they were











Feepayer $425 $448 67% $16,375 $18,719
DIR $427 $420 61% $13,877 $15,299
Job Develop-ment $361 $383 58% $12,833 $13,958
Job Entry $268 $324 61% $8,016 $12,113
Skills Shortages $377 $480 75% $18,775 $24,245
UI-Only/non-trainee $477 $428 --- $18,082 $19,981
In the Feepayer program, the typical respondent was 32 years old with 13 years of education. They earned
$425 weekly in their last job prior to UI and $448 in their job after. Training courses lasted 34 weeks and 2/3
obtained jobs in the field they trained for. In the two years prior to UI, the average annual earnings were
$16,375, with the annual earnings being $2,344 more in the second year after UI. In DIR, clients on average
were 31 years old with 12 years of education. They earned $427 per week in their last job prior to UI and
$420 in the first job following. Training courses lasted 19 weeks and 61% got jobs in the fields they were
training for. Average annual earnings two years prior to UI were $13,877, with earnings of $1,422 more in the
second year following UI. In the Job Development program, trainees were among the oldest with an average
age of 33, and with twelve years of education. Trainees were also mostly women. They earned $361 in their
last jobs before UI and $383 in their jobs after UI. Development training lasted 31 weeks and 58% got in-trade
placement. Earnings averaged $12,833 in the second year before UI and $1,125 more in second year following
UI. In the Job Entry program, the typical respondent was 31 years old with twelve years of education. The ratio
of women to men was 7:3, and it was in this group that the lowest earnings were reported. They earned $268
before and $324 after. Training would last 27 weeks and 61% were able to obtain jobs in the fields for which
they were training. Average earnings two years prior to UI were $8,016 and $4,097 more in the second year
afterwards. In the Skill Shortages program, were among the youngest, with an average age of 28, and with
twelve years of education. Trainees were overwhelmingly male -- 88% -- and nearly 3/4 were apprentices. They
earned $377 before UI and $480 after. Training courses lasted 19 weeks and 75% obtained jobs they trained
for. Average earnings two years prior to UI were $18,775 and $5,470 in the second year after. This group
actually showed the greatest gain. And lastly, the Non-trainees were the oldest of all the groups with an average
age of 35. They were also among the least educated, with ten years on average. They earned $477 before UI
and $428 after. But despite this initial loss of earning power, they were still ahead in their second year
following UI. Average earnings two years prior to UI were $18,082 and $1,899 more in the second year
following UI.
Overall, the study found that participants in the Feepayer and Skills Shortages programs were no more likely to
become reemployed than UI-only groups. DIR, Job Development and Job Entry trainees were generally less
likely than UI-only claimants to obtain a job after UI and/or training. Trainees, however, did require
substantially less time -- 11-17 weeks depending on the training program -- than non-trainees to find a job
following UI/training. Still, a modest but significant rise in the incidence of welfare receipt was observed for
Job Entry and Job Development clients.(47) 
There are those who caution against the use of UI for retraining programs. Lee Hansen and James Byers, for
instance, argue that while proposals to join together traditional unemployment compensation with retraining
might have a certain appeal, they may actually threaten the integrity and viability of the long-established
unemployment compensation system by joining together two quite different functions which will be difficult to
link effectively and will add considerable cost to the UI system. In particular, they emphasize the uniqueness ofthe American system. Three elements distinguish the American system from European ones. The first is that
the American system is narrowly focused and represents a radical departure from relief or welfare programs.
Second, the U.S. system has been completely wage-related, rather than needs-related, as is the case in Europe.
The third and perhaps most important element is that the American system was designed to be insurance. It is
this third point which they believe would be seriously undermined if training programs were to be joined to
traditional UI. And to use their analogy, to assume that UI should support a worker in retraining is analogous
to expecting that an auto insurance company will pay for one's children's driving lessons.(48) 
Perhaps the real issue is why has employment policy been abandoned. As Weir has noted, for a nation
claiming the work ethic as a central feature of its political identity, the U.S. has been lax in introducing and
sustaining policies which actively promote employment. There would appear to be a paradox in American
social and economic policy. In part, the answer may lie in the fact that employment policies became entangled
with two concerns in American politics: 1) the economic and political position of minorities and 2) the role of
the federal government. As Weir sees it, the defeat of the Full Employment bill in 1945 signaled the political
failure of "social Keynesianism" which joined economic and social policies by institutionalizing government
spending to ensure full employment. During the 1950s, a structuralist view of labor markets had emerged. Few
empirically oriented economists in the Labor Department began to support a range of policies including skill
training, job placement, measures to aid mobility, and public employment. This line of thinking did have an
influence on the War on Poverty programs which had incorporated two decisions about the proper focus of
labor market policies. First, there should be remedial measures targeted on the lowest end of the labor market.
And second, policy should aim to alter the supply of labor by mobilizing workers' characteristics, as opposed
to seeking to change the demand for labor.
It doesn't follow, however, that just because employment policies in the past may have had little success,
employment policies in the future will similarly meet with little success. Rather many were hindered because of
the political context in which they were forged. The political fate of the War on Poverty was deeply affected by
its identification with the upheaval in racial politics during the 1960s. Following the War on Poverty, efforts to
link poverty to employment problems simply faced new barriers. Policy was essentially carved up into two
realms: the politics of economic policy and the politics of poverty. But neither one of them were united by a
broader politics of employment. And with the breakdown of the near-consensus on Keynesian ideas which had
characterized the economics discipline for almost two decades, the views of Milton Friedman and Martin
Feldstein regarding natural rates of unemployment became increasingly more popular among academic
economists.(49)
Implications for Policy
As diverse as the literature is on unemployment insurance, there would appear to be a single theme which
stands out: The current UI system does require change. But it is on the issue of what type of change that there
is a wide spectrum of thought. There would appear to be two major directions for change. One is to maintain
the basic integrity of the system and make some adjustments intended to affect both individual and firm
behavior. The other is to overhaul the system completely -- to transform it into a system offering temporary
relief during periods of economic distress into a system which facilitates labor market transitions in
conjunction with economic transformations. But these two different directions stem from fundamentally
opposing premises. The first direction merely assumes that the system is so designed that in either encourages
firms to make more use of layoffs or workers to opt for greater leisure as opposed to more intensive job
search. It does not necessarily assume that there is a mismatch between the jobs which are available and the
skills which workers are able to sell to prospective employers. The other approach, however, does. It assumes
that the economy has changed, and that a system designed to assist workers during spells of temporary layoff
is not equipped to truly assist those workers who will never be called back because their skills are now
obsolete. The system must attempt to find ways by which workers can be prepared for new economic
circumstances. These directions rest on fundamentally different assumptions, and what isn't clear is which
school is correct. What would appear to be clear is that the policies of training and other programs aimed at
offering individuals a wider array of choice, would also be more expensive. But as to whether they are effective
enough to justify the costs isn't entirely conclusive. The simpler approach, and perhaps more reasonable one in the absence of conclusive data is to look for ways
the current system can be modified. First and foremost, there needs to be a more perfect experience rating so
that it will effectively be more costly for firms to lay workers off unless it is absolutely necessary. Regardless
as to which direction the policymaker might be inclined to take, this is something which at a minimum ought to
be done. It isn't clear as to how much of a reduction in unemployment this would lead to, but it is believed that
it could lead to a reduction. Anderson and Meyer have noted that the "main source of incentives of layoffs on
the margin appears to be that the tax rates rise too slowly as benefit payments minus tax payments
increase."(50) Even if large corporations and multinational firms were to still find it more cost-efficient to pay
the higher taxes while still laying off workers, smaller firms might still find it more difficult.
After this, there are perhaps two additional approaches which ought to be taken. One approach is to make
adjustments which will alter individual behavior. The other is to make adjustments which will alter firm
behavior. Those who see the system as distorting individual behavior, the answer is quite simple: remove the
disincentive to leisure and truly motivate those who are laid off to look intensively for work. The chief
exponent of this view is Martin Feldstein. At a symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in
August of 1994, Feldstein reasserted a long held position of his; that unemployment insurance and other labor
market policies increase the rate of unemployment. If UI isn't to be eliminated altogether, it should be subject to
higher taxes, so that the UI net replacement rate will be less. As it currently stands, UI benefits, although it is
subject to federal taxation, is not subject to the normal payroll deductions which would include social security,
state taxes, and local taxes. As a result, an individual may receive a net replacement rate of more than 60%
relative to potential net wages if the same individual was working. This is so despite the fact that gross
replacement wages may only be 50%. The answer, then, is to subject UI benefits to more taxation so that it will
be less attractive.(51) This approach might be reasonable if it can be shown that there are sufficient jobs to go
around. But at the same time it seems a little harsh for those who truly cannot find work. 
Feldstein actually suggests going a step further, whereby UI benefits would be treated like self-employment
income. Then it would be subject to the payroll tax, which would cause them to offset the EITC and other
benefit payments. Even more radical that this, he proposes to end giving UI to those who had previously had
above average earnings. But he would continue providing a maximum benefit equal to the current average --
about $200 a week -- which would provide protection while reducing the labor market distortion. Higher
income employed individuals would thus be induced to save more as a reserve to supplement their UI benefits.
Moreover, he would encourage this by offering tax-favored unemployment savings accounts. This he believes
would cost less than the current system.(52) There are, however, some problems with this. One is that he offers
no real evidence that this would cost the system less. But beyond, one has to wonder just which class he is
trying to help. If he believes that the UI system encourages distortions and that high earners shouldn't get any
benefits, why is he willing to offer as much as a $200 a week benefit? In many states, this is still roughly 2/3
the maximum benefit. But if he wants to encourage savings by tax-favored unemployment savings accounts,
why would there even be a need to offer a maximum benefit to these individuals at all? On the face of it, this
would appear to be contradictory. And yet, one cannot help but wonder whether this isn't another thinly
disguised attempt to redistribute benefits from those at the bottom of the income distribution to those at the top.
It is hard to escape this conclusion given his desire to tax the benefits of those at the lower end of the
distribution so as to offset the so-called distortive effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and other
programs. At a minimum, this demonstrates that Feldstein doesn't completely understand the EITC. One only
gets a credit if one works and earns income. A low-wage worker who loses a job and thus is no longer entitled
to the EITC will have less of a replacement ratio as a function of UI; not more. 
At a minimum, the system should be so structured so as to protect the most vulnerable in society. Instead of
making individuals bear most of the burden for their unemployment, perhaps public policy should strive to
shift the burden to firms. The other approach, then, is to encourage firms to retain workers by adopting
work-sharing policies. Although Work Sharing might be more expensive, it might also be more beneficial. It
would enable individuals who would otherwise be laid off during a period of economic downturn to continue to
be employed. Workers would not only maintain their skills, they would more importantly maintain their
dignity. But this, in and of itself, would be no panacea. The fact remains that obsolete industries will still be
forced to layoff those whose skills are from a bygone era.The two directions outlined above are perhaps the simplest adjustments which can be made to the current UI
system, without fundamentally altering the purpose it was intended to have. Neither one of them would
necessarily obviate the need to offer retraining. But it would represent a positive first step towards reforming
the system so that it is brought into the twenty-first century. In time, it may turn out that what is needed is a
program which will combine job training with income maintenance. This might require a program which would
move us more in the direction of a comprehensive employment program. Such a program would most likely
involve greater centralization, rather than less.
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